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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This action has for its background the con-
struction of a concrete-lined irrigation ditch ap-
proximately 6 miles in length from the Koosharem 
Reservoir to the town of Koosharem in Sevier Coun-
ty, Utah. 
Plaintiff claims the sum of $29, 720.32 for 
equipment rental and miscellaneous accounts from 
defendant, Fred Reynolds, and his bonding com-
pany, General Insurance Company of America, for 
rental and material consumed in the course of the 
construction project. Plaintiff claims this amount 
1 
for ( 1) Breach of contract and in the alternafae 
(2) Dam~ges for negligence by defendant, Fred 
Reynolds, 111 the construction of the canal. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
The action was tried to a jury on Special In-
terrogatories. The jury found in favor of plaintiff 
and judgment for plaintiff's claim in the amount 
of $29,720.32 was entered by the Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek a reversal of the judgment. 
an accounting between plaintiff and defendant Rey-
nolds and an award to General Insurance Company 
of America of its costs and attorney's fees against 
plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in the Brief of Appel-
lants are as they contend them to be and not as 
they must be viewed on appeal favorable to the ver-
dict and hence a further statement in this Brief is 
necessary. 
Plaintiff is a corporation generally engaged 
in the business of ready-mixed concrete, sand and 
gravel, road gravels, and canal linings. It maintains 
its principal place of business at Price, Utah (R. 
118). 
Defendant, Fred Reynolds, also resides in Price, 
Utah and for many years has been a general con-
2 
tractor. Over the years defendant Reynolds had 
purchased concrete from the plaintiff and at the 
time the Koosharem Canal Project came up, he was 
contemplating the purchase of a stock interest in 
Eastern Utah Development Company (R. 133). 
In August or September, 1961, Eastern Utah 
DeYelopment Company had received an invitation to 
bid on the Koosharem job. Mr. Fausett, vice presi-
dent of plaintiff, and Mr. Reynolds had discussed 
the job in Mr. Fausett's office in Price, Utah in 
that both had equipment that could be used on this 
project ( R. 133). Later both Reynolds and Fausett 
visited the Richfield office of the United States 
Soil Conservation Service and obtained plans for 
the project and at the same time both had visited 
the project site and walked over it to determine 
what special problems would be involved. 
We digress at this point to explain the nature 
of the work involved in concrete canal lining because 
of its importance to plaintiff's theory of the case. 
Old irrigation ditches in this state for the most 
part were constructed without patient attention to 
detail. The farmers simply didn't have the equip-
ment necessary to properly construct a ditch. Con-
sequently the gradient from water source to point 
of use was often not uniform and this would materi-
ally decrease the volume of water that a ditch could 
carry. Concrete linings of these canals if done pro-
perly increase the efficiency of the ditch, the volume 
3 
of water that it can carry, and they avoid watei· 
loss through seepage. 
Proper concrete lining construction require 
that first the ditch be cleaned by removing roe~ 
and vegetation and then it must be cut deeper and 
wider than the finished ditch will eventually be. This 
rough cut is then completely filled with good clean 
fill material free of large rocks and debris. This 
fill is brought up to what will be the finished grade. 
In construction parlance this is called the pad. The 
ditch is then re-cut to proper depth and slope of 
sides. This must be done in order that the concrete 
lining will have a good compacted base. A boat or 
slip form is then placed in the newly cut ditch and 
pulled along the ditch as the concrete is poured 
into the form and rolled off to the bottom and sides 
of the new canal. Each of these steps must be done 
precisely in order that the finished concrete ditch 
will conform to the specifications. For instance, the 
specifications of the Koosharem canal do not per· 
mit a variance in grade of more than plus or minus 
one-tenth of a foot in 100 feet ('R. 264). 
The Koosharem ditch was cut with a parsons 
cutter. This is essentially a trenching machine with 
side cutters. As it moves along the ditch, it re-
moves the newly placed fill material, throws it to 
the side, and at the same time shapes the slope of 
the sides of the ditch. If the old ditch has not ~n 
properly cut and cleaned and if the fill material 
is not free from rocks and debris, the cutter can· 
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not do its job properly. Improper cleaning of the 
ditch and rocks and fill will cause the cutter to be 
out of alignment or grade or both. 
The proper construction of the pad has been 
mentioned in detail at this point because the evi-
dence shows conclusively that the pad was not con-
structed properly by defendant Reynolds and this 
is what led to the difficulties that prompted this 
law suit. 
Continuing the history of this case, we find 
that after the preliminary talks between Max Fau-
sett and defendant Reynolds a bid for this job was 
put together by these two and submitted to the 
Koosharem Irrigation Company. Thereafter a con-
tract to construct the cement-lined ditch was award-
ed to defendant Reynolds. Reference to Ex. 2d will 
show that Mr. Reynolds entered into this contract 
on his own. His is the only signature that appears 
on the contract documents. At about the same time 
(October or November, 1961), defendant Reynolds 
obtained a bond from the defendant, General Insur-
ance Company of America, for the payment of labor 
and materials used on the project and to guaranty 
performance of the contract. Reference to Exhibit 
3d will show that defendant Reynolds is the only 
principal named on the bond. In fact, at that time 
the bonding company had no knowledge of any ar-
rangements entered into by plaintiff and Fred Rey-
nolds and, in fact, General Insurance Company of 
America would not accept Eastern Utah Develop-
5 
ment Company as a principal on the bond had r . ap-~) icat10n been made therefor (See the testimony of 
msurance agent, Dale Barton, R. 224). 
Prior to the bidding of this construction pro-
ject, plaintiff and defendant Reynolds had agreed 
that each would contribute certain equipment to the 
prosecution of the work and that plaintiff would 
furnish two of its foremen, namely Jack World 
and Frank Williamson, to supervise the construc-
tion of the pad, cutting the same, and pouring the 
concrete. 
After the contract was let to Mr. Reynolds and 
a bond obtained by him, it was determined by plain-
tiff and Reynolds that the actual construction of 
the pad should be sub-contracted to a contractor 
in the Richfield area. For this purpose Mr. Fausett 
and Mr. Reynolds went to Richfield the following 
week (R. 146). Mr. Reynolds knew Mr. L.A. Young 
who had the necessary equipment to construct the pad 
and he advised Mr. Fausett that Mr. Young would 
get on the job and get the work done. However, Mr. 
Reynolds was never able to get Mr. Young on the 
job to do that work (R. 206-207). Mr. Fausett was 
unable to proceed in that regard because from the 
moment the contract was signed, Mr. Reynolds took 
the attitude that it was strictly his job and he would 
depend on Mr. Young (R. 183). Thereafter Rey· 
nolds never did get sufficient equipment on the job 
to efficiently clean, fill, and grade the pad. 
6 
The only other work done during the winter of 
1961-1962 was to stock-pile gravel from the reser-
voir to the construction site. This gravel haul was 
pel'formed by the plaintiff. 
In April of 1962 Mr. Reynolds moved his trailer 
to the job site and commenced clearing the old ditch 
in Section 5 which would be the section of the ditch 
fartherest from the reservoir (R. 148-149). (For 
convenience the construction project was divided 
into 5 sections running consecutively from the reser-
voir to the town of Koosharem-Ex. 6). After Mr. 
Reynolds had been there for a short period, he and 
Mr. Fausett had a telephone conversation. Rather 
than just clean out the old ditch, Mr. Reynolds in-
dicated that he had run into real good fill dirt and 
had used it to back fill practically all of Section 5. 
Three or four days later during the first part 
of May, 1962 Mr. Fausett visited the job site and 
found that Mr. Reynolds had back filled the most 
part of Section 5 ( R. 152). The back filling done 
by Mr. Reynolds appeared to be too rocky and Mr. 
Fausett again explained to Mr. Reynolds, as he 
had before any construction started, that rocky fill 
material would cause the cutter to jam and be out 
of alignment and grade and the resulting ditch 
would not pass the Government specifications (R. 
153). At that time Mr. Reynolds assured Mr. Fau-
sett that he would not use that type of material in 
the rest of the construction and that he would per-
mit the plaintiff's supervisors, Jack World and 
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Frank 'Villiamson, to run the actual construction 
of the pad (R. 155). 
Mr. Fausett visited the construction site sever-
al days later at a time when the pad in Section 5 
constructed by Mr. Reynolds was being cut (R. 
156). At that time Mr. Fausett observed that the i 
cutter was cutting material that was full of rocks 
' that the cutter was being bumped and jarred, that 
the resulting ditch was jagged and rocky, and the 1 
ditch was not suitable for the concrete pour that 
was to follow. This observation can be readily seen 
by reference to Ex. 1 p which is a photograph show-
ing the cutter in operation on the Section 5 pad that 
was constructed by Reynolds. Again he and Mr. 
Reynolds had a conversation and Mr. Fausett stated 
to him that they could not tolerate the type of ma-
terial the cutter encountered in the pad. Mr. Rey-
nolds replied that he could see that, but also stated 
that he would have better material in the future (R. 
158). 
At a further time in June of 1962, in response 
to a call from the men on the job, Mr. Fausett again 
visited the project site. At this time approximately 
20 per cent of the pad had been cut. His testimony 
cncerning what he found at that time is significant. 
"Q. When you got there, what did you ob-
serve? 
"A. I found that the same conditions e~isted 
that - the rocks were still th~re m t~e 
pad - the center line of the ditch - in 
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fact, in some instances, it was not even 
kept track of. 
"They were even cutting out away from 
the old ditch, the dirt that had not even 
been disturbed; also, there was not grade 
stakes for the cutter to follow. The pad 
was too narrow." 
He further found that the cutter was working 
much less than its potential capacity, that they were 
cutting only from 140 to 160 feet per day, and the 
cutter should have been making from 600 to 800 
feet per day. The cause, of course, was simply that 
the cutter could not cut the rocky material that de-
fendant Reynolds had been using to construct the 
pad ( R. 161 ) . 
On that day the most important event of this 
case occurred. Mr. Fausett and Mr. Reynolds had 
a meeting in Mr. Reynolds' trailer and at that time 
Mr. Fausett stated his dissatisfaction with the way 
Mr. Reynolds was running the job and informed Mr. 
Reynolds that he wanted no further part of it and 
that he was pulling off the job. He told Mr. Rey-
nolds that he wanted no part of the profits on the 
job and would no longer be responsible for the re-
sults because Reynolds was going to get in trouble 
if he continued with the methods he had been using. 
Mr. Reynolds replied that he was bonded and that 
he could not finish the job without the cutter. Mr. 
Fausett then stated that he would leave the cutter 
and the other equipment on the job providing that 
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Mr. Reynolds would agree to maintain the cutter 
and pay for the equipment rental and continue to 
pay the labor and material accounts that had been 
agreed to. Mr. Reynolds agreed to this providing 
Mr. Fausett would leave the cutter on the job and 
also plaintiff's employee, Jack World (R. 162). 
Mr. Reynolds admits that such a meeting oc-
curred and that he was informed by Mr. Fausett 
that Eastern Utah Development Company was pull-
ing off the job. He does not admit the change in the 
original agreement, but did admit that the subject 
of rental payment was discussed (R. 397). 
The testimony of Mr. Fausett and Mr. Reynolds 
framed the single most important issue in the case 
and that is whether the agreement between Eastern 
Utah Development Company and Mr. Reynolds had 
been changed as a result of the meeting that took 
place in June of 1962. The jury resolved this issue 
in favor of the plaintiff. 
In the Special Verdict given to the jury, the 
following question was given and the following an· 
swer given: 
"2. In the said talk between Mr. Fausett 
and Mr. Reynolds, did they agree th~t 
their original agreement would be m~di· 
fied in the future conduct of the JOb, 
in that Eastern Utah Development Com· 
pany's equipment. would. remain on~~ 
job until complet10n of it, ~ut that m 
stead of sharing in the profits, Eastern 
Utah Development Company would re· 
10 
ceive from M;r. Re~nolds rental pay-
ments for said eqmpment during its 
use? 
Answer: Yes 
Signed: Everett A. Bird 
Foreman" 
Support for the jury's finding of an agreement 
between the plaintiff and Mr. Reynolds is found in 
the testimony of Mr. Fausett and also payments 
made to plaintiff by defendant Reynolds. From the 
time construction first started, Mr. Fausett would 
contact Mr. Reynolds about every 30 to 60 days 
concerning payments of the various accounts. Each 
time Mr. Reynolds would receive estimates from the 
Canal Company, he would make a payment to East-
ern Utah Development Company without specifying 
any application of funds and at no time did he deny 
his agreement to pay the various accounts includ-
ing the rental account (R. 172 and Ex. 26d). 
After the meeting between the two principals 
in this case in June of 1962, Mr. Reynolds remained 
on the job and finished it. The following year in the 
spring of 1963 it became necessary for him to make 
some corrections on the work he had completed. Mr. 
Reynolds contacted Mr. Fausett and asked if Mr. 
World would accompany him to Richfield for this 
purpose. This was agreed to providing Mr. Reynolds 
paid Mr. World's salary and made an agreement 
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with him concerning his subsistence. Mr. Reynolds 
agreed to this and Mr. World did work on the job 
site in the spring of 1963. Part of his salary was 
paid by Mr. Reynolds. (See Exhibit 26d for pay. 
ments to lVfr. \Vorld in May and June of 1963.) 
Even after this corrective work was done, the job 
did not meet the Government's specifications. Mr. 
Harold Brown the Government engineer assigned to 
this project testified ( R. 263-268) that the speci-
fications permitted only 1/10 of a foot in 100 feet 
out of grade. Later the canal company decided to 
allow a plus or minus 2/10 of a foot in 100 feet to 
push the project along, but even so the gradient of 
the ditch exceeded this tolerance in many instances 
- Section 1 - 36 per cent; Section 2 - 38 per cent; 
Section 3 - 21 per cent; Section 4 - 30 per cent; and 
Section 5 - 25 per cent. The project also called for 
certain concrete structures that were the responsi-
bility of Mr. Reynolds. We refer the Court to Ex-
hibits 12, 13, and 14 which are photographs of cer-
tain of these structures taken in the spring of 1963, 
less than a year after Mr. Reynolds did the work. 
They quite clearly depict very poor construction 
methods as the concrete is severely cracked and 
broken. 
The above is a history of this matter. When Mr. 
Reynolds stopped making payments on Plaintiff's 




THE DEFENDANT BONDING COMP ANY IS 
FULLY LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF AND IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO INDEMNITY AGAINST THE PLAIN-
TIFF. 
Points I and III of appellants' Brief contain 
common or related questions of law and are, there-
fore, appropriately argued under a single point. 
In appellants' first and most extensively ar-
fued point, the defendant bonding company says the 
action against it should be dismissed as a matter of 
law. The two defendants made common cause 
against the Complaint of plaintiff in the lower court, 
but now the bonding company seeks to cut its prin-
cipal, the defendant Reynolds, adrift and asked that 
it be absolved from any liability concerning the bond 
it wrote guaranteeing completion of the Koosharem 
Canal Company job and payment for materials and 
supplies so far as concerns the claim of plaintiff. 
It says in effect that since plaintiff started the 
project as a joint venture with its principal, Fred 
Reynolds, that plaintiff too is a principal and can-
not claim the benefits of the bond. No cases of guar-
anty or suretyship are cited to the Court. It ignores 
the facts of the case. Indeed its thinking is strati-
fied in certain legal principles of partnership which 
have little or no application to this case. 
It fails to mention that the Koosharem contract 
was awarded to Fred Reynolds alone; the bond was 
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written in his name alone as principal; whatever 
contract existed between Reyonolds and the plain. 
tiff was unknown to defendant bonding companv 
when it issued its bond; and all funds from the o~­
er were received by their principal Reynolds, de-
posited in his account, and drawn on his sole sig-
nature. 
A detailed analysis of the facts of this case will 
show that the bonding company is liable. It is true 
that plaintiff and defendant Reynolds started the 
project as a joint venture. However, from the very 
first the aspects of partnership were missing. Joint 
control did not exist. Defendant Reynolds assumed 
control of the project immediately to the exclusion 
of the plaintiff ( R. 183). He took the contract in 
his own name. (Ex. 2d) . The bond was issued in 
his name alone (Ex. 3d). Early in the game Rey-
nolds made it abundantly clear to the Government 
engineers that he was the contractor on the job. 
Mr. Harold Brown, the project engineer employed 
by the United States Soil Conservation Service, tes· 
tified: 
"A. He (Reynolds) told me in words to ~e 
effect that he was the contractor on this 
job; that all order~ would be gi~en to 
him and he was gomg to run the JOb as 
his ~ork as he saw fit, and I was to have 
no conn~ction in any way with Eastern 
Utah Development Company." (R. 263) 
Reynolds agreed to pay and in fact did P.ay 
for all or part of all labor and material accounts m· 
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eluding those of plaintiff. (Ex. 26d - See also the 
testimony of defendant Reynolds, R. 382.) 
Further as expressly found by the jury in this 
case, defendant Reynolds agreed to pay the rental 
account of plaintiff and in considerati·on plaintiff 
claimed no profits on the job ( R. 54 - 57). It is just 
the same as if the defendant Reynolds had hired 
the equipment of some third person to complete the 
job. This being the case the bonding company be-
comes liable to the plaintiff just as it would be liable 
to any other third party. This is particularly true 
when by its own evidence it admits that it had no 
knoweledge of plaintiff's interest in the contract 
and placed no reliance on the plaintiff's credit. But 
on the other hand, they wrote the bond solely in the 
name of its principal, Fred Reynolds, and relied 
solely on his indemnity agreement. 
In point is the case of Jennings et al vs. Pratt 
et al, 19 Utah 129, 46 P. 951. This was a suit to 
collect a promissory note. Evidence developed that 
one of the plaintiffs seeking relief was a member 
of the partnership and association that executed 
the note. Defendants argued that the action could 
not be maintained and that plaintiffs' only remedy 
was a suit for contribution. The Court ruled: 
"The rule is doubtless well settled that, in the 
absence of a settlement of accounts, one part-
ner cannot sue another at law upon a de-
mand which has grown out of a partnership 
transaction, but when the claim of one part-
15 
ne1: agains.t co:partners arises out of a ti·ans. 
act10n which is not properly a pa1tnershi 
matter, the rule does not apply. Nor is ther~ 
any .s~und reason why ~ partner should be 
P.roh1b1ted from transactmg business with his 
firm, the sa1:1e a~ any o!her person; and when 
the transact~on is ?Ot intended as a part of 
a partnership business? or to be accounted 
for as such, no reason is apparent why such 
partner should not be entitled to the same 
remedy as another individual would be 
"\Vhere partners have seen fit to deal ~ith 
each other without reference to the final ac-
counting, . the transaction is not subject to 
the necess1 ty or delay of such an accounting." 
See also Prows vs. Hawley, 72 Utah 444, 271 
P. 31. 
Associated closely with the bonding company's 
claim that it should be dismissed as a matter of law, 
is its claim that plaintiff is bound to indemnify it 
as argued under its Point III. The legal obligation 
of indemnity is merely assumed by the defendant 
bonding company. They cite no authoritative cases 
nor does it present any arguments as to why legally 
this obligation should exist. 
The fact of the matter is that the indemnity 
agreement (Ex. 33d) that the bonding company 
relies on is dated 11 July 1960 and signed by Fred 
M. Reynolds and Charlotte J. Reynolds. It is dated 
long before the contract for the Koosharem Canal ' 
Company was let and long before any negotiations 
between plaintiff and defendant Reynolds concern· 
ing the construction of the canal. The bonding com· 
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pany had no knowledge of any interest of plaintiff 
in the contract with Koosharem Canal Company; 
its placed no reliance on its credit; and would not 
under any circumstances issue it a bond. There is 
no legal reason why a partner cannot deal with a 
partnership as any third person providing it is 
understood that the item of business is not treated 
by the partners as partnership business which is 
this case. 
Cul'iously on the one hand, the bonding com-
pany says that Eastern Utah Development Company 
is a principal on the bond and thus estopped from 
claiming under the bond. It welcomes the plaintiff 
as a principal for this purpose. On the other hand, 
it says that it would not accept Eastern Utah De-
Yelopment Company as a principal on any bond in 
any case. The bonding company agent, Mr. Dale 
Barton, testified. 
~,A. The bank in Price had called us to see 
if we would license them to handle bonds 
for them, and he was mentioned - Mr. 
Hill mentioned Eastern Utah Develop-
ment Company. 
"vV e then, of course, obtained credit in-
formation, and it was very poor. We 
were not interested in handling the ac-
count." 
The stance assumed by the bonding company is 
to say the very least awkward. 
The contention of the bonding company regard-
ing indemnity finds no support in the law. In the 
17 
case of Southern Surety Conipany vs. Plott 28 F 
2d 698 ( CCA . 4th 1928), one of the partne~s in ~ 
road construct10n company obtained a contract with 
the State in its own name and also a bond from th 
piaintiff in its own name. There was no evidenc: 
that the plaintiff surety company knew of the part-
nership. After the surety company incurred a loss 
on the project, it brought action against each of 
the partners for reimbursement. A demurrer to the 
Complaint in the lower court was affirmed on ap-
peal. The appellant court held that a surety can 
obtain indemnity or reimbursement only from that 
person who is a principal on the bond and a party 
to the indemnity agreement. The Court quoted with 
approval Pingrey on Suretyship, Section 179: 
"The surety can look for reimbursement only 
to the rights of his principal, and not to a 
stranger. Where a surety is on the bond of 
one of several partners, he cannot look to the 
partnership for indemnity, if he has to pay 
the debt, though the bond was given to secure 
a partnership debt. A surety cannot charge 
any other person as his principal exc~pt the 
one who is principal at the time of making t~e 
contract of suretyship. No privity .can e~1st 
between the parties except that w:h1ch. arises 
on the bond or contract, and an implied as-
sumpsit cannot arise beyond the partners on 
the bond or in the contract." 
In accord with the principle announced in the above 
case, are Spokane Union Stockyards Company ~s: 
Maryland Casualty Company, 178 P. 3 (Wash. ' 
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and School District No. 6 of Wallowa County vs. 
Smith, 127 P. 7, 97 (Ore.). 
For an analogous Utah case, see the recent case 
of Neu: Hmnpshire Insurance Company vs. Ballard 
Trade, Inc., et al, ---- Utah 2d ____ , 404 P. 2d 675. In 
that case the plaintiff fire insurance company paid 
a fire loss to the lessor of property and sought to 
recover from the lessee on the lessee's agreement with 
the lessor to indemnify for loss. The Court stated 
in part: 
"That when the assignee here has accepted 
a consideration to cover a risk, it hardly lies 
in its mouth to claim indemnity from one who 
has made a written guaranty against loss, to 
which agreement the insurance company was 
neither a party nor expressly or impliedfy a 
beneficiary, ... " 
POINT II. 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PLAINTIFF REMAIN-
ED A PARTNER WITH DEFENDANT, FRED REY-
XOLDS, \VAS NOT BEFORE THE LOWER COURT. 
The issue before the lower court was whether 
plaintiff and defendant Reynolds had terminated or 
modified their agreement to the extent that plain-
tiff would give up its claim to partnership profits 
in exchange for payment by defendant Reynolds of 
its rental account. The jury on special interroga-
tories specifically found that the agreement was 
modif ed to this extent and that the parties did agree 
that plaintiff would give up its claim to partnership 
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profits in exchange for payment by Reynolds of its 
rental account. 
In Point II of appellants' Brief, it is urged 
that the Court erred in failing to rule as a matter of 
law that plaintiff remained a partner for the pur. 
pose of winding up partnership business. This point 
cannot be related to any finding of the jury (R. 54. 
5'7) or to any action of the trial judge. (Reproduced , 
herein as Appendix "A" is the Memorandum Deci- 1 
sion of the lower court which concisely set.s forth 
the claims of the parties, the issues, and the re- ' 
suits.) Appellants cite no portion of the Record 
where this point is raised. Whether or not plaintiff 
is a partner seems to be a moot point because the 
jury found that the agreement was not terminated, 
but modified. 
Appellants do however make statements in Point 
II of their Brief concerning certain evidence in the 
case which must be challenged. 
On Page 16 of appellants' Brief, they state that 
plaintiff admits that Reynolds protested the plain· 
tiff's leaving the job and cite Pages 162, 364-366 
in support thereof. Page 162 of the Brief contains ' 
the testimony of Mr. Fausett and this testimony 
is to the effect that defendant agreed to the new 
arrangements wherein he would run the job and 
pay the plaintiff its equipment rental. Pages 364· 
366 of the Record contain the testimony of defend· 
ant Reynolds which differs from the testimony of 
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Mr. Fausett only in that Mr. Reynolds states that 
he did not agree to the new arrangement. 
Again on Page 16 of appellants' Brief, they 
state: 
"The evidence clearly shows that the plain-
tiff did not reach a mutual understanding 
\vith defendant Reynolds concerning the term-
ination of the partnership." 
The same pages of the Record, namely Pages 162, 
364-366, are cited. The evidence is not as clear as 
appellants would have this Court believe. In fact, 
the testimony of these two men frame the disputed 
issue as to what understanding was reached and 
the jury decided that question in favor of the plain-
tiff. 
POINT Ill. 
THE counT DID NOT ERROR IN FAILING TO 
GIVE ANY OF DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTIONS ON THEIR THEORY OF THE CASE. 
The lower court submitted this case to the jury 
on special interrogatories pursuant to Rule 49 (a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Submission 
to the jury in this manner is discretionary with the 
Court. Hanks vs. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 
P. 2d 564; Utah Home Fire Insurance Company, 
15 U. 2d 257, 391 P. 2d 290. It should be added that 
where, as in a case like this, the evidence is lengthy 
and the issues complex, it is desirable that the jury 
be asked to answer specific questions rather than 
reach a general verdict after a lengthy complicated 
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set of instructions. In Moore's Federal Pr t' 
S d Ed. . S . ac ice, econ it10n, ecbon 49.03 (3), it is stated: 
"Use .of the special verdict eliminates the 
~ecessity for and us~ of complicated instruc. 
~ions on the law, which are a normal concom. 
itan~ of th~ g~neral verdict ... When the 
special. verdict is used, the C~urt should give 
t? the JU~J' only such explanat10n and instruc. 
tions as i~ dee~s nece.ssa~J' to enable the jurv 
to make mtelhgent fmdmgs upon the issue's 
of facts submitted." 
Appellants in this action say the Court com. 
mitted reversible error in failing to give any of 
their requested instructions, respecting their theory 
of the case. We are not told in their Brief what par-
ticular theory of law they are ref erring to nor have 
they shown in what manner they have been pre· 
judiced thereby. They do state that the Court failed 
to inform the jury of the rights and duties of part· 
ners to each other in the performance of partner· 
ship obligations and failed to instruct the jury as 
to the rights and duties of the partners in regard ' 
to the bonding company and a failure to instruct 
on the obligations of partners in winding up part· 
nership business. In reply, respondent asserts that 
each of the matters set forth by appellants are mat· 1 
ters of law for the determination of the Court and I 
not matters of fact with which a jury need be con· 
cerned. Further, the issues in this case are whet~er 
or not defendant Reynolds agreed to pay the plam· 
tiff for its equipment rental and whether he was 
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negligent in the prosecution of the construction 
project. The matters raised by appellants in their 
Brief and their requested instructions are concerned 
with law that is outside the scope of those issues. 
Aside from the considerations above there is 
even a more fundamental answer to appellants' con-
tention of error in failing to give their requested 
instructions. In 53 Am. J ur. Trials, Section 638, 
it is stated: 
"Where a special verict is required, it is im-
proper to instruct the jury generally concern-
ing the law of the case, for the reason that 
inasmuch as the jury are not to apply the law 
to the facts, instructions as to the law can 
serve no useful purpose." 
It would have been reversible error had the 
Court given a general charge on the rights and 
duties of the parties and the effect their answers 
to special interrogatories would have had on those 
rights and duties, 90 A.L.R. 2d 1040. Analysis of 
the requested instructions of the appellants will 
show that this is exactly what they sought by their 
requested instructions. In other words, the requested 
instructions state principles of law which would 
have informed the jury as to the effect of their 
answers to special interrogatories or upon the ulti-
mate rights or liabilities of the parties and the final 
judgment in the litigation, which is improper. 
The special verdict given by the lower court 
and the general instructions as to the burden of 
23 
proof accurately and adequately framed th · 
f th . . e issue or e Jury. There is no error. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
ING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE ISSUE OF ~AAMIL­
AGES. . 
Plaintiff in this action claims from the de-
fendant the sum of $29, 720.32. This amount is 





















Plaintiff claimed this amount on two theorfos. 
Namely, that the defendant, Fred Reynolds, had 
agreed to pay the accounts and had breached his 
agreement and that defendant Reynolds was negli-
fent in the management and operation of the con· 
struction project and caused damage to plaintiff 
in the amount of the above accounts. In each theory 
plaintiff claims the same amount. 
In their Fifth Point of Argument, defendanra 
contend that the jury found both plaintiff and de-
fendant Reynolds guilty of negligence in the com· 
. tiff mencement of the project, but that after plain . 
abandoned the project, Reynolds was free of negli· 
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gence. Hence, plaintiff can claim no damages and 
the Court committed error. in awarding damage. 
Defendants overlook the fact that the jury did 
find that Reynolds had breached his agreement and, 
therefore, plaintiff was entitled to a judgment in 
the amount of its account. No error was committed 
by the lower court in finding plaintiff was entitled 
thereto as a matter of law. There can be no question 
concerning the accuracy and completeness of plain-
tiff's accounts. In each instance an original invoice 
was made on or near the time of the event in ques-
tion. At the end of each month a copy of the invoice 
and a copy of the ledger account was mailed to de-
fendant Reynolds (R. 164). On numerous occasions 
during and after the completion of the project, Mr. 
Fausett asked Mr. Reynolds for money on the ac-
counts and periodically from the start of the job 
until after its completion unspecified payments in 
lump sums were made. The last payment was Feb-
ruary 13, 1963. 
The only account questioned in this law suit 
is the equipment rental account, Ex. 9. Mr. Reynolds 
had already agreed to pay other accounts (R. 168). 
At trial defendants offered no evidence in ex-
planation or denial of the items set forth on plain-
tiff's Exhibit 9. Instead defendant Reynolds intro-
duced an Exhibit 31 ( d) prepared by himself and 
his son (Ex. 31d) for the purpose of trial which 
merely reflected defendant Reynold's memory con-
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cerning .the time the equipment of the plaintiff w 
on the JOb. He testified: ~ 
"Q. Now, you claim this was made up fr 
your own records? om 
"A. Yes Sir. 
"Q. Where are they? 
"A. In my head I guess." 
Comparison on the Exhibits shows that the 
defendant Reynolds admits the sum of $14,889.00 
owed on the equipment rental account as compared 
to $19,886. 79 as shown by plaintiff's Exhibit 9. 
Further comparison will show that defendant has 
simply rounded off the length of time the equipment 
was on the job and omitted other periods of time 
that were recorded by plaintiff at or near the time 
of the event. Obviously these periods of time were 
forgotten by defendant during the period between 
the completion of the project and this law suit. 
If the question had been submitted to the jury, 
they could return only one amount for the other 
if they found for the plaintiff. Necessarily one ac· 
count or the other had to be rejected. To accept 
defendant's memory, the jury would have to ignore 
the actual records of plaintiff made at the time or 
near the occurrence of the event. They would have 
to further ignore the fact that defendant had re-
ceived monthly statements of the account and had 
made general unspecified payments to plaintiff after 
the account was rendered. Such a verdict would 
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have been speculative and against the manifest 
weight of the evidence. These paramount factors 
made this issue a matter of law for the Court and 
,vas correctly withheld from the jury. 
POINT V. 
THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO SPECIAL INTERROG-
ATORIES WERE NOT INCONSISTENT. 
Appellants in Point VI. of their Brief argue 
that the jury's answers to Interrogatories #2 and 
.;:t-3 are inconsistent and, therefore, should be totally 
disregarded. These two Interrogatories and the an-
swers given by the jury are as follows: 
"2. In the said talk between Mr. Fausett 
and Mr. Reynolds, did they agree that 
their original agreement would be modi-
fied in future conduct of the jo!?,, in that 
the Eastern Utah Development l.iompany 
equipment would remain on the job until 
completion of it, but that instead of 
sharing in the profits, Eastern Utah De-
velopment Company would receive from 
Mr. Reynolds rental payments for said 
equipment during its use? 
Answer Yes 
Everett A. Bird 
Foreman 
"3. In the meeting between Mr. Fausett and 
Mr. Reynolds, did they agree that their 
original arrangement would be complete-
ly terminated as of that time; that Mr. 
Reynolds would take the job over him-
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self, .but that M~·· Reynolds would 
permitted to continue to use the eq .be 
ment of Eastern Utah Developm1:; 
Company on a rental-payment basis 
' Answer No 
Everett A. Bird 
Foreman" 
The import of the two questions is ( 1) Whether 
the parties agreed to modify their original agree. 
men t, or ( 2) Whether they agreed to terminate their 
original agreement. There is substantial evidence 
in the Record to support an affirmative answer to 
each of the questions. Only if the jury had answered 
"yes" to each question would there have been a con· 
tradiction. 
The testimony of Mr. Fausett shows that at 
the June meeting of the two parties it was then 
agreed that plaintiff would leave its equipment on 
the job until its completion, but that instead of 
sharing profits, Mr. Reynolds would make rental 
payments to Eastern Utah Development Company. 
This evidence is entirely consistent with the jury's 
affirmative answer to Question #2. 
Appellants made no specific objection to the I 
form of Questions No. 2 and 3 nor did they contend I 
that they were confusing or that answers thereto ~ 
could be contradictory. In the case of Baker ·vs. 
Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308 P. 2d 264, this Court 
held that under a similar Record, these matters 
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could not be raised for the first time on appeal. See 
also the case of Milligan vs. Capital Furniture Com-
pany, 8 Utah 2d 383, 335 P. 2d 619 for a discussion 
of the matter of inconsistency in answers on a 
special verdict. 
POINT VI. 
PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS ARE NOT LIMfTED TO 
THAT OF AN ACCOUNTING FROM DEFENDANT, 
FRED REYNOLDS: 
At the time of the trial of this action, the irri-
gation company had paid to defendant Reynolds 
approximately $100,000.00 and there was still due 
and owing to him the sum of approximately 
$39,000.00. (R. 321). 
Defendant Reynolds alone signed the contract 
with the irrigation company. He alone has the power 
to deal with them and if necessary, to obtain the 
money still due and owing by legal process. 
Again the Court is directed to the Utah case 
of Jennings et al vs. Pratt et al (supra) where this 
statement is made: 
"Where partners have seen fit to deal with 
each other without reference to the final ac-
counting, the transaction is not subject to the 
necessity or delay of such an accounting." 
The facts in this case show that the parties 
agreed that Reynolds would pay the accounts of 
plaintiff and that plaintiff would waive any claim 
for profits to be made on the job. By this agree-
ment, these accounts were not intended as part of 
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the. partnersh~p pay~1ents and, hence plaintiff had 
a right to brmg act10n therefor prior to the time 
that Reynolds had collected the balance due 0 th t t . . n e cons rue 10n proJect. 
More specifically, appellants did not ask f . 
t . . h 1 
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an accoun ing in t e ower court. They merely as. 
ser~ed. that this was the only remedy available to 
plaintiff (see Pre-Trial Order - R. 46). The judg. 
ment of the lower court is without prejudice to an 
accounting (see appendix A). In view of this reser-
vation and the holding of Jennings v. Pratt (supra) 
there is no error. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff brought this action for the collection 
of its account in the amount of $29,720.32. Its the-
ories were ( 1) That defendant breached an agree-
ment to pay said account and (2) That defendant 
was negligent in his construction efforts and thus 
caused plaintiff damage in the amount of its ac-
count. The Court submitted the questions to the 
jury on a special verdict and the jury found that 
defendant had agreed to make payment of the 
account. Accordingly, judgment was awarded to 
the plaintiff. 
Based upon defendant's agreement to pay and 
plaintiff's waiver of any claim for profits out of 
the J0 ob the parties have treated the matter~ be-
' h" b nes.5 ing outside the scope of the partners ip usi 
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and hence, an accounting for this item is unneces-
sary. 
The agreement of defendant to pay the account 
places the plaintiff on the same footing as any other 
third party furnishing labor and materials to a 
construction project and the bonding company is, 
therefore, liable on its performance and completion 
bond. It cannot set up the bar of indemnity because 
it has no indemnity agreement with the plaintiff. 
It cannot set up the bar of partnership because it 
had no knowledge of plaintiff's interest in the con-
tract and would not have accepted plaintiff as a 
principal on the bond in any event, and the parties 
treated this account as an item outside the partner-
ship business. 
It relied strictly on the ability and financial 
capacity of defendant, Fred Reynolds, and cannot 
be heard to complain if compelled to pay for labor 
and materials that its principal, Reynolds, agreed 
to pay. 
No error was committed by the lower court in 
the conduct of the trial and the verdict of the jury 
and judgment of the Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
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